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Abstract 
 
We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005 to 2009 
to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under 
IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about 
financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, 
salary inflation, and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries.  
We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key 
assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-
specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of 
pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three 
assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the 
findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of 
managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding 
positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the 
reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used 
reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be 
determined.  We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to 
justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions. 
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Introduction 
Recent accounting standards on pensions accounting require companies which 
sponsor defined benefit pension (DBP) plans to recognise their funded status on the 
balance sheet or disclose this status in the notes to the financial statements. Funded 
status is measured as the difference between the fair value of plan assets and the value 
of the related liabilities, and many companies report deficits, i.e. DBP liabilities 
exceed assets.   
 
The compression of the funded status of a DBP plan into a single figure 
creates an ‘illusion of certainty’, whereas ‘uncertainty is the distinguishing 
characteristic … uncertainty as to how much pay is deferred; uncertainty as to the 
amounts and timing of the future pension payments; uncertainty as to the discount rate 
to be used to calculate their present value; and uncertainty as to the future cash flows 
of the plan assets that will be used to settle those liabilities’ (Blake et al. 2008, pp. 5, 
37). The research reported in this paper is motivated by this uncertainty, and the 
opportunity that it provides for management of the reported funded status. 
 
Uncertainty arises largely because of the challenge of measuring the size of 
the (very long-term) pension liabilities. The valuation of DBP liabilities depends on 
four key actuarial assumptions about financial and demographic variables: the 
discount rate used to convert future liabilities to a present value; the rates of future 
price and salary inflation; and mortality rates/life expectancy of plan 
members/beneficiaries. The sensitivity of the funded status to changes in these 
assumptions creates scope for the exercise of managerial discretion in their selection, 
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and a former Chief Executive of the UK’s Financial Reporting Council reportedly 
suggested that this facilitates the use of ‘the magic telescope ... to make very big 
things appear very small’ (Williams 2005, p. 18).  
 
The use of a ‘magic telescope’ may also apply in other contexts where the 
reliability or usefulness of accounting numbers is open to question due to the 
sensitivity of measurements to alternative assumptions. In the US under SFAS 106, 
the financial statements must include information about the obligations and costs to 
companies of providing postretirement health benefits for employees, the values of 
which, like pension benefits, are sensitive to variations in underlying assumptions 
about life expectancies, discount rates and other factors. Another example would be 
decommissioning costs in sectors such as the power industry, where companies must 
report provisions made for decommissioning assets such as gas storage units or power 
stations at the end of their useful lives. IAS 37 (IASB, 1998) defines such provisions 
as the best estimates of the present value of the anticipated future decommissioning 
costs. Like pension liabilities, provisions may be very large and highly sensitive to 
changes in assumptions such as environmental costs and the discount rate. Similar 
issues apply to the provisions for long term liabilities in accounting by insurance 
companies. We therefore suggest that the ‘magic telescope’ concept extends beyond 
pensions accounting and is of wider relevance to financial accounting researchers.   
 
This paper seeks to establish whether managers apply a ‘magic telescope’ to 
DBP liability valuations in the UK. We test for systematic differences in companies’ 
choices of assumptions using multiple regression analysis on data for a panel of FTSE 
350 companies reporting under IAS 19 over 2005-09, and conclude that some 
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companies appear to exercise discretion in a manner that reduces reported pension 
liabilities. More specifically, we confirm US findings (Thies and Sturrock 1988; 
Godwin 1999; Asthana 1999) that companies with relatively poorly-funded DBP 
plans tend to make assumptions that lower their liability valuations. We also find 
support for US evidence (Feldstein and Mørck 1983; Bodie et al. 1987) of a 
relationship between assumptions and the size of the pension plan relative to the 
company’s size. Our UK evidence of reporting under IAS 19 does not, however, 
indicate any link between pension assumptions and company profitability, or debt 
ratio, contrary to the findings of three US papers (Bodie et al. 1987; Godwin et al. 
1997; Asthana 1999) and one UK paper (Li and Klumpes 2013). We therefore add to 
the three UK papers which provide contradictory evidence on the factors influencing 
the choice of assumptions used in the valuation of DBP liabilities under earlier UK 
standards (see discussion below of these papers: Byrne et al. 2007; Sweeting 2011; Li 
and Klumpes 2013). 
 
Our paper makes two contributions. Firstly, we address the literature gap 
identified by Glaum (2009, p. 306) that ‘almost all existing studies on pensions 
accounting are based on US accounting and capital-market data ...’.  Gordon and 
Gallery (2012, p. 18) use pension accounting to illustrate the possibility of 
‘comparability mirage’ in apparently similar institutional settings. It is therefore 
necessary to test whether conclusions developed using US data apply in the UK 
because of some significant differences between the two countries in pension and 
accounting regulation and practice. For example, in the UK, but not the US, increases 
in pensions in the course of payment and deferred pensions are linked to price 
inflation. Consequently, UK DBP liability valuations incorporate an additional 
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inflation assumption. Analysis of this requirement allows us to contribute to the 
literature by comparing the degree of variation in companies’ choices across three 
financial assumptions rather than the two - discount rate and salary inflation - that 
characterise the US literature. We find greatest variation in the assumptions for salary 
inflation, the selection of which is most flexible under the IAS 19 guidance.  
 
There are other notable differences in the respective regulatory environments 
for pensions. For example, the specific rules on the level of employer contributions to 
plans in the US (Asthana 1999, p. 49) do not apply in the UK; US plans generally do 
not require employee contributions (Gordon and Gallery 2012, p. 16); and the US 
regulatory framework, although similar to the UK, is much more mature, with a 
minimum funding requirement and a national protection or guarantee fund in place 
since 1974. In contrast, these arrangements were not implemented in the UK until 
1997 and 2004 respectively (Glaum 2009, p. 303). There are also differences in 
corporate law, for example regarding bankruptcy provisions, between the US and the 
UK which can impact on pension plans. In addition, UK reporting practice under IAS 
19 differs from US GAAP in some respects:  for example, in the US SFAS 158 
(FASB 2006) requires actuarial gains and losses to be recycled into the income 
statement, whereas IAS 19 does not.   IAS 19 also permits options, the take-up of 
which varies by country, and UK reporting practice may reflect use of the earlier FRS 
17 (Fasshauer et al. 2008, p. 35). 
 
Our second contribution is to build on US studies (for example Hann et al. 
2007) which have sought to use standardised assumptions to overcome the ‘distortion’ 
that hampers comparison of the funded status of DBP plans across companies. This 
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situation arises as a plan’s apparently favourable reported funded status may itself 
reflect a company’s choice of assumptions. We introduce such standardisation to UK 
data, which previous research has not done, and demonstrate the importance of this in 
contrasting regression results obtained using the reported versus the standardised 
funded status. Further, the standardised measure of a DBP plan’s liabilities which we 
derive incorporates price inflation assumptions in addition to the discount rate and 
salary inflation assumptions used by previous researchers. 
 
Our findings have important implications for accounting regulators seeking to 
eliminate balance sheet management and encourage more transparent and comparable 
reporting practices.  Financial reporting regulations are influential in determining both 
the absolute size of reported DBP deficits and companies’ response to them (Kiosse 
and Peasnell 2009). The ‘magic telescope’ may influence how companies manage 
their pension deficits by closing plans to new entrants, limiting pensionable salaries, 
raising retirement ages or curtailing benefits by ceasing future accrual of pension 
benefits for existing plan members (Klumpes et al. 2009). Indeed, most companies 
have already taken such steps (Office for National Statistics, 2014).  
 
These wider economic consequences of accounting practice are particularly 
important in the UK, where DBP plans remain significant in economic and financial 
terms for the sponsoring companies, investors, employees, and other stakeholders. In 
mid-2015, the pension liabilities of FTSE 100 companies were estimated at £553 
billion and their pension assets at £528 billion, with the companies’ contributions to 
these plans equalling £12.5 billion during 2014 (Lane Clark and Peacock 2015, p. 6). 
Additionally, at their 2014 financial year-end 63 out of the 87 constituents of the 
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FTSE 100 with a DBP plan reported deficits, with six companies having pension 
liabilities exceeding their market capitalisation, and 38 companies reporting pension 
assets of less than 90% of pension liabilities (Lane Clark and Peacock 2015, pp. 18, 
41). When a company becomes insolvent its DBP plan assets are transferred to the 
Pension Protection Fund, the pension liabilities of which have increased from £4 
billion in 2009 to £18 billion in 2015 (Pension Protection Fund 2009, 2015). 
 
Understanding the significance of pension liabilities and plan deficits poses 
difficulties for investors (see, for example:  Coronado and Sharpe 2003; Picconi 2006; 
Coronado et al. 2008). Glaum (2009) surveyed the wider literature on the ‘credit-’ and 
‘value-relevance’ of pension accounting, and subsequent papers confirm its 
importance to UK companies:  McKillop and Pogue (2011) found that pension plans’ 
financial position is value-relevant and factored into credit ratings; and Liu and Tonks 
(2013) found evidence that higher company contributions to pension plans ‘crowd 
out’ dividends or reinvestment.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first outline the 
academic evidence on the management of reported pension liability values arising 
from the selection of key actuarial assumptions. The following section provides the 
regulatory background on accounting for pensions, paying particular attention to the 
extent of discretion available under IAS 19 in the choice of assumptions. We then use 
this preceding discussion to frame the hypotheses we wish to test before describing 
our methodology and how we derive our standardised measures of DBP plan financial 
strength. Details of the data set are included in the next section, followed by the 
reporting and discussion of our results. The paper concludes with a consideration of 
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the implications of our findings for accounting regulators, and opportunities for future 
research. 
 
2. Management discretion and pension accounting numbers – academic 
evidence 
We now consider the academic evidence regarding the use of management 
discretion in the valuation of pension liabilities.  
 
 US evidence supports the notion that managers exercise ‘opportunistic’ 
(Glaum, 2009, p. 293) discretion in their selection of the assumptions that underpin 
the accounting for pension plans. Blankley and Swanson (1995) found evidence 
that discount rate changes lagged changes in bond yields, leading to 
underestimation of the value of future liabilities. Ghicas (1990) found that 
companies attempting to reduce contributions to their pension plan increased the 
discount rate and then changed their choice of actuarial method to further reduce 
liabilities. A survey by Klumpes (2001) concluded that management of the reported 
figures increased following adoption of SFAS 87. This standard imposed 
restrictions on assumptions about discount rates and the expected rates of return on 
plan assets, but allowed for the exercise of choice over other assumptions, including 
mortality, length of working life of plan members and projected rates of salary 
growth. Some researchers using US data (Amir and Benartzi 1998; Bergstresser et 
al. 2006; Comprix and Muller 2006; Asthana 2008) found evidence of management 
discretion in the choice of the assumed rate of return on pension assets, which 
impacts on reported earnings rather than the valuation of liabilities. Bias in 
assumptions in the US was found to be lower after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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(Comprix and Muller 2011). These issues are not specific to private sector 
companies: Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) observed that US public sector pension 
plans vary assumptions in order to manage pension costs, with reference to political 
pressure and financial constraints. In contrast, Naughton et al. (2015) found that 
assumptions used to value the liabilities of a US state’s pension plans depended on 
the financial well-being of the state. 
 
Some studies of US companies have found that where plans are poorly funded 
assumptions tend to be less conservative, resulting in lower liability valuations. A 
survey by Thies and Sturrock (1988) found that companies with weak plans tended to 
use higher discount rates, and Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1995) found companies 
also used low salary growth assumptions. Godwin (1999) found that companies with 
plans where assets were low relative to liabilities used less conservative discount rate 
assumptions and that, when the Securities and Exchange Commission tightened 
specifications on how the discount rate was to be determined, companies responded 
by lowering their assumptions about future salary inflation. Asthana’s (1999) study 
found that companies with well-funded plans applied more conservative assumptions 
than those with underfunded plans. 
 
Some US results also suggest that managerial discretion is greater where the 
pension plan financial position is important relative to company size. Feldstein and 
Mørck (1983) reported that the discount rate was higher where the pension plan 
deficit was large in relation to the company’s assets. Bodie et al. (1987) similarly 
found that companies where the deficit exceeded 30% of the market value of equity 
chose a higher discount rate than others.   
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Using US cross-section data from 1980, Bodie et al. (1987) found that less 
profitable companies tended to use relatively high discount rates, thus lowering 
reported pension liabilities. Godwin et al. (1997) used US data from 1981-83 and 
found companies were likely to increase the discount rate in response to declines in 
profits, increasingly restrictive dividend constraints and tightening debt covenants. In 
other words, managers used their discretion to choose assumptions that would 
produce an outcome that mitigated less favourable aspects of financial performance. 
Asthana (1999) found that companies made more conservative assumptions if they 
were more profitable, had higher cash flows from operations, or had a low level of 
debt.  
 
Several authors have recognised the problem that the funding ratio (i.e. 
pension assets divided by pension liabilities) is influenced by the choice of discount 
rate. Companies’ reported pension liabilities therefore need to be adjusted to a 
common basis to uncover the underlying relationship (Feldstein and Mørck 1983; 
Bodie et al. 1987; Francis and Reiter 1987; Gopalakrishman and Sugrue 1995; Carroll 
and Niehaus 1998; and Godwin 1999). Asthana (1999) and Hann et al. (2007) go 
further and also adjust for differences in companies’ salary inflation assumptions. 
 
We conclude from the US evidence that significant discretion is available to 
companies in the valuation of pension liabilities, and that there are systematic factors 
relevant to companies’ choice of assumptions. In particular, the funded status of plans 
and the financial position of plans relative to company size appear to be relevant, 
while other factors such as profitability also play a part. It is reasonable to expect that 
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such findings may also be relevant to UK plans, although this cannot be assumed 
given the differences between the US and UK in pension provision and the regulatory 
and legal framework. 
 
Three papers on UK practice produced some contrasting results from the US 
research. Sweeting (2011) examined FTSE 100 non-financial companies reporting 
under SSAP 24 over 1989-2005. He found no relationship between funding ratio and 
choice of discount rate, but concluded that large companies, measured by assets, used 
high discount rates. Li and Klumpes (2013) analysed the discount rate used by FTSE 
350 companies reporting under SSAP 24 over 1998-2002 and concluded that high 
discount rates were associated with highly-leveraged companies and weakly-funded 
pension plans. Byrne et al. (2007) studied assumptions used by FTSE 350 companies 
reporting under FRS 17 over 2001-04 when calculations of assets and liabilities were 
similar to those under IAS 19; they found that companies with well-funded plans 
tended to use high discount rates. Larger companies, measured by market 
capitalisation, tended to use lower discount rates, which differs from the conclusion of 
the papers studying SSAP 24 (using assets as their proxy for size). This is, however, 
consistent with Ghicas’s (1990) view, using US data, that large companies will use 
methods that decrease income and assets, to avoid attracting attention from regulators 
and politicians. However, none of the three UK papers standardised the value of 
pension liabilities to reflect their dependence on the assumptions made. 
 
 A complementary stream of research has used computer simulation models to 
test the scope for income smoothing as a result of changes in actuarial assumptions 
(see, for example, Amen 2007; and Morrill et al. 2009).  More recently, a study has 
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used simulation analysis to evaluate the relationship between accounting versus 
economic measures of a company’s pension liability in response to changes in the 
assumed discount rate (Klumpes, 2010).  These simulation studies all indicate the 
sensitivity of the pension liability estimation to actuarial assumptions.  They therefore 
confirm the findings of the empirical literature - that simplifying the funded status of a 
DBP plan into a single number creates uncertainty, and provides opportunities for the 
exercise of managerial discretion in the estimation process. 
 
In his survey of pension accounting, Glaum (2009, p. 293) concluded that the 
evidence to date indicates that ‘managers have scope for discretion, in particular, 
when setting assumptions. Findings from both US and UK research suggest that 
managers exercise this discretion in opportunistic ways’. Equivalent academic 
research evidence on pension reporting practice under IFRS is, however, lacking and 
the UK provides a setting in which to examine this gap in the literature. First, 
however, it is necessary to consider the extent to which IAS regulations offer scope 
for the exercise of discretion in the selection of assumptions.  
 
3. Regulatory Background 
In the UK in 2000 the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) introduced FRS 17, 
which required balance sheet recognition of the funded status of pension plans, 
although an extended transitional period allowed companies to defer full 
implementation until 2005. From January 2005, pension reporting by listed groups in 
the European Union has been regulated by IAS 19 (IASB 2004), which requires 
companies to recognise the funded status of their pension plans on the balance sheet 
or disclose this information in the notes to the financial statements. 
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The determination of the value of DBP liabilities is heavily dependent on four 
key assumptions – discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation and mortality rates – 
which are selected by management on the basis of expert actuarial advice.  IAS 19 
(IASB 2004, para. 73) described these assumptions as ‘an entity’s best estimates of 
the variables that will determine the ultimate cost of providing post-employment 
benefits’. IAS 19 required companies to disclose the principal assumptions used, 
including, where applicable, the discount rate, increases in an index that is the basis 
for pension increases (we regard price inflation as covered by this), salary increases, 
and any other material actuarial assumptions used. There was no explicit mention of 
mortality rates, which we would ordinarily regard as material, and disclosure of this 
assumption has been variable (O’Brien et al. 2010). For accounting periods beginning 
on or after 1 January 2013 a revised version of IAS 19 requires disclosure of 
‘significant actuarial assumptions’ (IASB 2011, para. 144), although discretion will 
continue to apply in their selection (see later discussion). 
 
DBP liabilities represent future cash flows and a discount rate is therefore 
required to derive their present value. The extended time horizon associated with such 
liabilities means that even small variations in the assumed discount rate can lead to 
significant changes in their present value. The ASB (2007, p. 17) gave an example of 
a 0.5% change in discount rate changing liabilities by 9.5%, a figure which may 
reflect the typical characteristics of a UK plan. Variation in the discount rate therefore 
represents a potential tool for the management of reported liabilities. 
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We take the view that IAS 19 constrains, but does not eliminate, the exercise 
of discretion in the selection of the discount rate. The future benefits are at a discount 
which ‘reflects the time value of money but not the actuarial or investment risk’ nor 
the entity-specific credit risk (IASB, 2012). This carries forward the requirement of 
the previous version of IAS 19 (IASB 2004, para. 78) that the discount rate should be 
determined with reference to the market yields on ‘high quality’, low risk corporate 
bonds, which, while not defined, are typically interpreted to mean AA-rated bonds. In 
principle, this should constrain variability in discount rate assumptions, but the 
variation in yields on AA-rated bonds over time leaves scope for the exercise of some 
discretion in selecting the discount rate. For example, at the end of 2011 the range of 
discount rates used by companies was narrow, with over 80% of FTSE 100 companies 
using a rate of 4.7-4.9% (Lane Clark and Peacock 2012, p. 53). In contrast, for FTSE 
100 companies reporting at 31 December 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis 
when bond yields were volatile, Lane Clark and Peacock (2009, p. 36) indicated that 
discount rates ranged from 5.6%-6.75%. They argued that IAS 19 therefore ‘fails a 
key test of an accounting standard; it no longer allows users of accounts to make a 
meaningful comparison between the pension plans of two companies, even those 
reporting at the same date’ (Lane Clark and Peacock 2009, p. 10). 
 
US evidence also indicates the potential for differences in reported discount 
rates. D’Souza (1998) investigated health benefit costs in electric utility companies 
and suggested that the requirement of the Financial Accounting Standards Board that 
the choice of discount rate be linked to the long-term yield on high-quality securities 
restricted variability in discount rates chosen. Nevertheless, Grant et al. (2007, p. 28) 
found that a sample of 81 S & P 100 companies used discount rates for pension 
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liabilities ranging from 5.5% to 6.3% in 2004, with such differences having a material 
impact on the size of the reported liabilities. 
  
The assumption about future price inflation is important as pension liabilities 
rise with price inflation. UK pension law requires that payments to DBP plan 
beneficiaries be inflation-linked, although plan rules may cap inflation adjustments.  It 
is also reasonable to expect that the assumed rate of price inflation will influence the 
company’s assumed rate of salary inflation. IAS 19 requires the price inflation 
assumption, as a financial assumption, to be based on market expectations (IASB 
2004, para. 77). FRS 17 suggested an approach which estimates inflation to be the 
difference between the yields on long-dated inflation-linked bonds and fixed-interest 
bonds of a similar credit rating. Although IAS 19 does not specifically mention this 
approach to determining the inflation assumption, UK companies, accustomed to FRS 
17, would consider such an approach that, if used, should constrain the exercise of 
discretion. 
 
Defined benefit liabilities to current employees will increase as their salaries 
rise, so the salary inflation assumption is an important element in the liability 
valuation. IAS 19 indicates that ‘[e]stimates of future salary increases [should] take 
account of inflation, seniority, promotion and other relevant factors, such as supply 
and demand in the employment market’ (IASB 2004, para. 84). Companies operate in 
different sectors where labour market conditions vary, and it is therefore possible that 
salary assumptions may be wide-ranging for justifiable reasons. In practice, however, 
the imprecision of the standard renders it difficult to evaluate the validity of a 
company’s chosen assumption, thus granting substantial discretion.  
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Mortality rate assumptions are essential for estimating future pension 
payments - the longer DBP plan beneficiaries live, the greater plan liabilities will be. 
Companies determine such assumptions using mortality tables, but may adjust them to 
reflect their own circumstances. For example, it is known that mortality rates differ 
between manual and non-manual workers (Johnson 2011), between different 
geographical regions (Office for National Statistics 2011), and between birth cohorts 
(Willetts 2004). There has been concern that companies’ mortality assumptions may 
not be up-to-date, failing to reflect increases in life expectancy (Pensions Regulator 
2006; Club Vita 2011). This suggests scope for management in the valuation of DBP 
liabilities, but we exclude this assumption from our empirical analysis as many 
companies fail to disclose their mortality assumptions over the period of our study. 
Additionally, inter-company differences in assumptions may be due to different 
occupational mixes. An external observer is therefore unable to differentiate between 
genuine versus discretionary inter-company differences in assumptions.  
 
The four assumptions discussed above interact to determine the present value 
of a company’s future pension liabilities, but we have noted differences in the scope 
for discretion in their selection. This analysis complements the evidence discussed 
earlier and provides the structure for analysing the issues to be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
We mention one other regulatory issue; the trustees of each UK DBP must 
arrange an actuarial valuation of plan assets and liabilities to assess plan solvency 
in accordance the Pensions Regulator’s rules, which allow the trustees to exercise 
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discretion in their choice of assumptions in a way rather different from IAS 19. 
We do not investigate the exercise of discretion in the solvency assessment 
valuation, although we acknowledge that such valuations may affect the 
management of plans (Klumpes and Whittington 2003). 
 
4. Hypotheses 
In this section we set out our hypotheses and their rationale. As argued above, 
IAS 19 differs in its strength of guidance on the choice of different assumptions. The 
discount rate has to reflect the yield on high-grade corporate bonds, and the price 
inflation rate would be expected to be based on the difference between the yields on 
fixed rate and index-linked bonds. In contrast, the rate of salary inflation assumption 
offers greater scope for flexibility. This suggests that companies have more discretion 
regarding this assumption, which will be reflected in greater variability, and provides 
the basis for our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Salary inflation assumptions vary more widely between companies than 
assumptions about the discount rate or price inflation.  
 
The evidence summarised earlier suggests that companies may adjust their 
assumptions in response to the financial positions of their DBP plans, both in relation 
to the size of the plan and the market value of the company. Two indicators appear 
relevant. First, as found by Thies and Sturrock (1988) and other authors as referred to 
in section 2, is the funding ratio of the plan. This is the assets divided by liabilities, 
which we adjust to a common basis, enabling us to derive a plan’s ‘standardised 
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funding ratio’ (SFR, discussed further in section 5.2). Second, we consider the 
importance of the plan’s financial position for the company as a whole, as referred to 
by Feldstein and Mørck (1983) and Bodie et al. (1987). We therefore calculate the 
plan surplus or deficit (assets minus liabilities) divided by the company’s market 
capitalisation, and refer to this as the ‘standardised solvency ratio’ (SSR, also 
discussed further below). In each case, a relatively weak ratio may lead the company 
to choose assumptions which improve the ratio by reducing reported liabilities i.e. less 
conservative assumptions for the discount rate, price and salary inflation (respectively 
higher, lower and lower). Hence our hypotheses are: 
 
H2: Companies where the pension plan has a relatively low standardised 
funding ratio tend to choose less conservative assumptions. 
H3: Companies where the standardised solvency ratio is relatively low tend to 
use less conservative assumptions. 
 
5. Methodology 
We test hypothesis 1 by using difference in means and variance tests. In 
particular, the F-test is appropriate for testing whether the difference in standard 
deviations is significant. For hypotheses 2 and 3, our tests use six standard regression 
equations, in order to test whether companies’ assumptions are related to the financial 
ratios as suggested. The dependent variables are the discount rate, price inflation and 
salary inflation assumptions and the independent variables are the funding ratio (either 
reported or ‘standardised’, as explained in section 5.2) and the SSR. 
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We include a number of control variables in the regressions (see Appendix for 
full definitions). First we note that IAS 19 identifies duration as relevant to selection 
of the term used to determine the discount rate. Similarly, the company’s assumptions 
of price inflation and salary inflation also depend on how far in the future are the 
liability cash flows. Few previous researchers have attempted to include duration as a 
control variable (Li and Klumpes 2013 is an exception), and a hindrance is that 
companies in this period were not required to disclose duration and rarely did. Our 
approach is to recognise that immature plans will have a higher duration than mature 
plans. We therefore include a proxy for immaturity of liabilities as a control variable: 
the ratio of the year-end plan liabilities to the cash benefits paid in the year 
(Liabs/Pmts). 
 
The second control variable (pensions income effect or PIE) captures the 
impact of the pension plan on company income.  IAS 19 offers companies the ability 
to exercise discretion in both the selection of assumptions and the treatment of 
actuarial gains and losses, which arise, for example, from changes in assumptions or 
when assumptions are not realised.  Such gains and losses may be recognised 
immediately in the income statement or through other comprehensive income (i.e. the 
statement of recognised gains and losses (STRGL) in the case of our sample 
companies), or deferred and amortised subject to the rules applying to the ‘corridor’ 
method (IASB 2004, para. 95). Companies may therefore be able to manage the 
pension plan impact on the income statement.  We therefore define PIE as the 
aggregate of pension-related entries to the income statement and actuarial gains and 
losses dealt with through the STRGL. 
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We also include three control variables following the work of Asthana (1999), 
who found that assumptions were less conservative if the company was making a high 
level of contributions to the plan, implying that the plan was a significant burden to 
the company or it was under financial pressure, as reflected in a high level of debt, 
poor cash flow and low profitability.  We exclude cash flow as this was highly 
correlated with profitability, meaning that we use contribution ratio, debt ratio and 
operating profits ratio. Finally, we include month dummies for each of the months in 
2005 to 2009 to control for month-specific effects. 
 
The standard regression equation we test in six different forms, omitting the 
month dummies for ease of presentation, is as follows: 
Assumptionit = β0 + β1FRit + β2SSRit + β3Liabsit/Pmtsit + β4PIEit + β5Contit + β6Debtit 
+ β7OPit + εit 
Where: 
Assumption is either the discount rate assumption, the price inflation 
assumption or the salary inflation assumption; FR is one of two measures of funding 
ratio, either reported or ‘standardised’; SSR is the standardised solvency ratio; 
Liabs/Pmts is the control for immaturity; PIE captures the pensions income effect; 
Cont is the contribution ratio; Debt is the debt ratio; and OP represents the operating 
profits ratio. ε represents the error term of the regression. The subscripts i and t 
represent company and time period respectively. Full definitions of the variables are 
in the Appendix. 
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 Our estimation strategy addresses two econometric issues of interest in the 
above regression equation. First, as we have a panel data set, we need to control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity normally present when there are different companies 
with potentially different characteristics. Second, as the three equations of interest for 
each measure of funding ratio share the same right hand side variables, we need to 
consider the possibility that the individual equations are related through their error 
terms. This could arise because a company considers jointly whether to make changes 
in its discount rate, salary inflation and price inflation assumptions. We therefore use 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression method developed by Zellner (1962), after first-
differencing all the variables in the equations to address the concern of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
As discussed previously, several authors have adjusted reported pension 
liabilities to an estimate of what they would have been had a common discount rate 
been used, while Asthana (1999) used an indirect method to adjust for companies’ 
discount rates and salary inflation assumptions. We extend these approaches by 
standardising for all three assumptions – the discount rate, price inflation and salary 
inflation. 
 
The reported funding ratio (RFR) of a company’s pension obligations is the 
ratio of its reported DBP assets to its reported DBP liabilities. The use of fair values in 
accordance with IAS19 ensures that pension assets are measured on a common basis, 
which for many assets will be market value. As already indicated, however, the RFR 
reflects the assumptions made by companies in valuing their pension liabilities, and is 
thus ‘distorted’ by this self-selection process. We therefore adjust reported pension 
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liabilities to eliminate the impact of variations in assumptions on the liability measure. 
The standardised value of liabilities, which we use in our SFR and SSR measures, is 
derived by adjusting the reported liability figure for each company to what we 
estimate it would have been had the company used the average assumption for all 
companies reporting in the same month. This methodology refines the approach of 
other authors (for example, Hann et al. 2007), who adjusted to averages for all 
companies reporting in a given year, which we regard as less satisfactory in periods 
subject to considerable variation in financial conditions. 
 
The adjustment back to average is made by assuming sensitivity levels as 
illustrated by the ASB (2007, p. 17). For example, ceteris paribus, a 0.5 % increase in 
assumed discount rate, price inflation, and salary inflation will lead to a 9.5% 
decrease, a 5.5% increase and a 3% increase in liabilities respectively. This approach 
assumes a uniformity of sensitivity to assumption changes across all plans, and whilst 
we acknowledge that plans have different characteristics and so the impact of 
different assumptions will not be uniform, we expect these standardisation factors to 
be satisfactory for this purpose. Unlike Hann et al. (2007), we do not use averages that 
are industry-specific, as (at least for the discount rate and price inflation assumptions) 
we would not expect industry-specific features to markedly affect what are essentially 
financial assumptions. 
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6. Data source, variables and summary statistics 
 
6.1 Data set and variables 
Our data are drawn from an extensive proprietary data set provided by Towers 
Watson, a leading firm of consulting actuaries. This data set was compiled from 
publicly-available sources (i.e. published financial statements), and should therefore 
be reproducible.  It is an unbalanced panel of listed companies in the FTSE 350 index 
with DBP plans and balance sheet dates from December 2005 to December 2009 
inclusive.  We excluded companies whose plans related mainly or wholly to non-UK 
liabilities. The number of companies in the data set therefore varies by year, and the 
composition of the data set also reflects changes in the FTSE 350 as companies joined 
and left the index. 
 
We analysed the companies’ IAS 19 disclosures of their assumptions for 
discount rates, price inflation and salary inflation. We omitted from the analysis three 
companies, which were the only companies to report in a particular month. We also 
omitted the salary inflation assumptions for eleven companies after they introduced a 
limit on the salary growth qualifying for pension purposes (the company’s 
assumptions in such cases therefore depended on the plan rules rather than the normal 
exercise of discretion). Where a range of figures for an assumption was reported, we 
used the mid-point, consistent with the approach used by the consulting actuaries 
Lane Clark and Peacock (various years) in their annual analyses of trends in 
companies’ assumptions. 
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6.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive data on the discount rate, price inflation, and 
salary inflation assumptions observed across the sample. The data show that there are 
ranges of values for all three assumptions, with the greatest spread relating to the 
assumed rates of salary inflation. The last three columns of the table report the 
absolute value of year-on-year changes in the assumptions. The means and standard 
deviations indicate that there are substantial variations in the values of the 
assumptions across companies and years, and the t-tests confirm that the means of the 
absolute values of the changes are significantly different from zero. We address the 
extent of variation in the assumptions in more depth below, and these statistics 
confirm existing research findings of a lack of uniformity and hence the possibility 
that discretion is exercised in the selection of assumptions.   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
7. Results and discussion 
In testing hypothesis 1, we take into account that the assumed discount rate, 
price inflation and salary inflation depend on market conditions, which change over 
time. We therefore test the variability of these assumptions for companies with a 
common balance sheet date, using the most popular date of 31 December.  Table 2 
shows the results. We use the F-test for differences in the standard deviations (SDs), 
comparing the ratio of the SD for salary inflation to the SD for each of the discount 
rate and price inflation. We find that, in each year, the ratio exceeds two and that F 
has a p-value of 0.0000 on each occasion, i.e. highly significant. These findings are 
consistent with hypothesis 1, confirming greater variation in salary inflation than the 
other assumptions.  
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 3 summarises the data used in testing hypotheses 2 and 3 and the 
correlations between the variables are in Table 4. The results of the regressions are in 
Table 5. We note from Table 3 that the average funding ratio on both a reported and 
standardised basis is less than 1, showing that DBP plans tend to be under-funded on 
both measures. The minimum and maximum values for these ratios indicate 
considerable variation in funding levels, although the means and standard deviations 
of the ratios are very similar for the sample as a whole. 
INSERT TABLES 3, 4, 5 HERE 
 
The results confirm hypotheses 2 and 3. Companies where the pension plan is 
relatively weak, measured by the SFR, tend to use less conservative assumptions, i.e. 
a high discount rate and low price inflation and salary inflation assumptions, each of 
which reduce reported liabilities (Table 5, models (1) to (3) ). All three regressions 
showed a significant finding at the 1% level for all of the discount rate, price inflation 
and salary inflation. Similarly, in confirming hypothesis 3 we found that the SSR was 
statistically significant at the 1% level in explaining the discount rate and at 10% in 
explaining the salary inflation assumption. We conclude that companies tended to use 
less conservative assumptions where there was a pension plan deficit which on a 
standardised basis was large relative to market capitalisation. Given that pension 
deficits constitute a form of corporate debt, such ‘managed’ understatement of 
liabilities has potential implications for the (in-) accuracy of a company’s credit 
rating. 
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In relation to the control variables, we find no significance in either the 
immaturity of the DBP plan or the effect of the plan on the company’s income 
statement. This confirms the work of Li and Klumpes (2013) who used a different 
approach to duration; this suggests that further work in this area would be useful. 
Other company-specific control variables are not significant, contrary to the US 
findings of Asthana (1999). We suggest this may reflect differences between the UK 
and US markets and pension regulations. For example, the UK does not have the rules 
that the US has on employer contributions, which may explain why we do not find 
contribution ratio significant. Many of the month dummies (which we do not report) 
are, however, significant, which is not surprising, given the changes in financial 
conditions that were taking place. 
 
The contrast between using the SFR and the RFR in our regressions is striking. 
Table 5 model (1) indicates that companies with a high SFR tend to use a low 
discount rate, whereas model (4) shows the reverse: companies with high RFRs 
appear to use high discount rates, with this evidence being statistically significant at 
the 1% level. But the RFR result masks the potential endogeneity problem that high 
discount rates lead to low reported liabilities and high RFRs. None of the previous UK 
papers used standardised ratios, and they found contrasting results: Byrne et al. (2007) 
found that companies with high discount rates reported stronger funding positions; 
Sweeting (2011) found no evidence of a link between funding position and choice of 
discount rate; and Li and Klumpes (2013) found that companies with weaker pension 
plans used higher rates.  Table 5 also shows that the results for the price inflation and 
salary inflation assumptions are reversed when using SFR and RFR. 
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In order to explore further the degree of variation in assumptions, and exercise 
of managerial discretion, we categorise those companies reporting at a 31 December 
2009 balance sheet date as having either ‘low’ (below median) or ‘high’ (above 
median) RFRs, SFRs and SSRs. We then use t-tests to establish whether the means of 
each of the discount rate, price inflation and salary inflation differ between the low 
and high groups. The results are shown in Table 6. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
We find that, compared to companies with high SFRs, those with low SFRs 
tend to use significantly lower price and salary inflation assumptions and higher 
discount rates. These choices tend to reduce the reported liabilities and increase RFRs. 
The analysis also shows significant differences in assumptions chosen by companies 
with low versus high SSRs. However, if we were to compare companies with low and 
high RFRs (compared with the median), the differences in assumptions would not 
appear significant. Once again, this demonstrates the importance of standardisation of 
pension plan liabilities. 
 
Our analysis shows that the greatest difference between companies is in the 
choice of salary inflation assumption, which supports our hypothesis that this is most 
open to the exercise of managerial discretion. But it is possible that companies with 
low salary inflation assumptions face labour market conditions which support such 
assumptions. It could be argued, for example, that companies with weaker pension 
plans seek to restrain future salary increases in order to limit liabilities, justifying 
assumptions of lower salary growth, although staffing issues may constrain such 
behaviour. Our finding (using the SFR, Table 5 model (3) ) that companies’ debt 
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ratios and profitability are not significant determinants of the salary inflation 
assumption suggests that, consistent with prior evidence, there is a case for the 
interpretation that there is some ‘opportunistic’ selection of assumptions to take 
advantage of the discretionary scope offered by IAS 19.   
 
To test the robustness of our results we use alternative standardisation factors, 
which are those found in a report which examined disclosures by FTSE 100 
companies in 2009.  This found that a 0.5% change in the discount rate, price inflation 
and salary inflation assumptions was associated with median changes in liabilities of 
8.5%, 6.2% and 1.6% respectively (O’Brien et al. 2010, p. 31).  These are the 
sensitivities for large companies and one year only, but provide a useful set of 
alternative standardisation factors. Table 7 summarises our results; we report only the 
signs and levels of significance for the independent variables SFR and SSR. There are 
some differences in the significance levels compared with the findings in Table 5, but 
the signs remain consistent throughout. We therefore demonstrate that our overall 
conclusions are robust to the use of alternative standardisation factors.   
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Various papers (Byrne et al. 2007, Sweeting 2011, and Li and Klumpes 2013 
using UK data; Feldstein and Mørck 1983, and Bodie et al. 1987 using US data) 
included company size as an explanatory variable in determining assumptions. We 
therefore tested alternative measures of company size (assets, equity, number of 
employees), but none were significant and we do not report these results. 
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8. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether managers apply a ‘magic 
telescope’ to DBP liability valuations in the UK by testing for systematic differences 
in companies’ choices of assumptions. Using multiple regression analysis on data for 
a panel of FTSE 350 companies reporting under IAS 19 over 2005-09 we found 
evidence that some companies appear to exercise discretion in a manner which 
reduces reported pension liabilities consistent with our hypotheses. 
 
Our findings contribute to the literature by extending the non-US research base 
and providing new insights into pension reporting practice under IAS 19 in the UK. 
We are unable to confirm US research results which suggest that the assumptions 
underpinning the liability valuation are linked to a company’s finances (profitability 
and debt) and plan contributions. The differing US versus UK results may reflect 
country by country variations in pension provision and funding, accounting rules and 
corporate law, suggesting that country-specific research in this area is important.  
 
We do, however, confirm US evidence (Feldstein and Mørck 1983; Bodie et 
al. 1987; Thies and Sturrock 1988; Godwin 1999; Asthana 1999) that assumptions are 
influenced by the funding position of a company’s DBP plans, and plan size relative 
to the company’s market capitalisation.  Comparing the degree of variation in 
companies’ choices across three financial assumptions rather than the two - discount 
rate and salary inflation - that characterise the US literature, we find greatest variation 
in the assumptions for salary inflation, the selection of which is most flexible under 
IAS 19. This suggests that less prescriptive regulations may encourage selectivity in 
the choice of assumptions.  
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If the International Accounting Standards Board aims to move to a more 
‘principles-based’ approach to standard-setting, this increases the role of professional 
judgment and potentially provides greater scope for the ‘management’ of reported 
results (Wüstemann and Wüstemann 2010). Such management may be limited 
through the design of standards or through the issue of International Financial 
Reporting Standard Interpretations (IFRICs). 
 
In view of the scope for less prescriptive regulation to encourage selective 
management of the pension liability value, one possible response could be for the 
IASB to provide more explicit guidance in IAS 19 on acceptable assumptions. 
However, variable economic conditions across the range of countries adopting IFRS, 
and specific company DBP plan rules may make a regulator-imposed assumption 
inappropriate. We therefore suggest that standard-setters focus on ensuring that users 
can understand companies’ assumptions and their significance. For example, national 
authorities could consider defining benchmarks, such as the government bond yield 
for the duration of the plan, and encourage or require companies to disclose this in 
addition to the discount rate used. They could also consider the scope to prescribe 
disclosure formats for mortality assumptions in order to facilitate comparability.  
 
Another possibility, also designed to increase understandability, would be to 
encourage companies to be more precise in justifying their choice of assumptions. To 
the extent that companies fail to do so, and use varying assumptions, it is open to 
analysts to make adjustments such as those used in this paper to produce standardised 
measures. Such calculations should be easier under the revised version of IAS 19, 
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effective from 2013, which requires companies to report the sensitivities of their 
liabilities to ‘reasonably possible’ changes in ‘each significant assumption’ (IASB 
2011, para. 145). The revised standard also requires disclosure of the duration of DBP 
plan liabilities, which means that the effect of plan duration can be investigated 
without the use of proxies as we and other researchers have had to do. Users of 
financial statements may then be able to overcome any ‘illusion of certainty’ (Blake et 
al. 2008) which allows liability values to be managed downwards. 
 
Accounting for pensions remains problematic and our work indicates several 
areas for future research. Firstly, there is scope to assess whether the revised IAS 19 
impacts on the exercise of discretion in the choice of assumptions. Secondly, further 
analysis of mortality assumptions may be possible as overall disclosures in this area 
should increase under the revised standard. Thirdly, it will be important to assess the 
effects on assumptions of changes such as the use of the Consumer Prices Index as the 
basis for indexation, the closure of DBP plans, the capping of pensionable salaries, 
and the post-crisis financial environment with persistent low interest rates. Finally, 
given the country-specific application of IAS 19, it would be interesting to see 
whether comparable research in countries other than the UK generates similar 
findings. 
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